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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
THE A AA DECISION
Invalidation of the Agricultural Adjustment Act by the
Supreme Court' has again confounded the prophets and spinners
of theories. Some of them2 find difficulty in confining their re-
marks within the bounds of decency, and even Mr. Justice Stones
veils but thinly, comments which are not examples of Mr. Wode-
house's gift of understatement. The writer would not wish to
appear as a self-appointed defender of the majority opinion, but
one becomes bored, if not irked, by people who point an accusing
finger at the Supreme Court for its rather wholesale toppling of
New Deal legislation, as if to say: "Now see what you have done."
Their attitude is that the fact that so many recent Acts of Con-
gress have been declared unconstitutional is proof that the
Supreme Court is actuated by improper motives. It seems never
to occur to such finger-pointers that perhaps Congress has en-
acted more unconstitutional legislation in the past three years than
in any other single period of our history. But then, policemen
are never popular, and if they have to arrest more offenders on
holidays than on week days, of course the fault lies with the
policemen.
The principle upon which the decision turned can be stated
rather shortly. The opinion4 first finds that the processing tax
is not exclusively a tax. A tax is "an exaction for the support
of government", whereas, the asserted tax here is an indispensable
part of a plan of regulation. This would seem to be in accordance
with the principles of the Ch~id Labor Tax Case.5 It was there
held that Congress cannot under the guise of a tax regulate local
matters. Thus at first glance, it only remained to decide whether
or not crop control and reduction of farm acreage is a local mat-
ter, and the ease is disposed of under the rule of stare decisis.
Not so: the opinion concedes that Congress has power to levy a
processing tax for the purpose of defraying general public ex-
penditures, and the power to spend public money in order to
promote the general welfare of the United States.' On the other
I United States v. Butler et a7, - U. S. - , 56 S. Ct. 312, decided January
6, 1936.
2For example, Howard Lee MeBain in the New York Times Magazine,
January 19, 1936.
s Dissenting opinion, supra n. 1, at 324.
4 Hereinafter the word "opinion" refers to Ithe majority opinion. The word
"dissent" refers to the dissenting opinion.
5259 U. S. 20, 42 S. Ct. 449 (1922).
0 Query: Should any distinction be made ibetween the general welfare of
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hand, it was said that Congress has no power to provide for the
general welfare independently of the taxing power. That is to
say, it cannot regulate local matters upon the theory that such
regulation promotes the general welfare. It can only tax for the
purpose of spending to that end. Since, then, the ChM7d Labor Tax
Case is not authority upon the question of the power to spend the
proceeds of an admittedly valid tax, it became necessary to go
beyond that ease. The real battleground is this: Can Congress
tax and ear-mark the proceeds for the purpose of spending them
in order to provide for the general welfare of.the United States,
if there is in addition the object and purpose to regulate local
matters ?
One must bear in mind the point of ear-marking the proceeds
of the tax. Both the opinion7 and the dissent8 apparently concur
in the view that Congress has no power to spend even general
revenues for purposes other than providing for the general wel-
fare.. But if, in violation of the Constitution it does so, no one
has the right to raise the question.9 The result is, then, that the
taxing power and the spending power are in theory equally ex-
tensive and equally limited. The dissent maintains that this is
the only limitation and that Congress having decided that crop
control is conducive to the promotion of the general welfare of the
United States, the Court cannot substitute its own ideas about the
matter, thereby usurping the legislative function. One could
agree with the dissent if one could accept its premise: that the
taxing and spending power are subject to the one limitation. That,
however, is the very point to be decided. The opinion holds that
the power is subject to a second limitation not to be found within
the general welfare clause itself, but in the Constitution as a whole.
The nature and dual form of our government is opposed to the
idea of an unlimited power of Congress in an unlimited field or
sphere of activity. This in no way conflicts with the complemen-
the United States, and the general welfare of the people of the United States?
Cf. The language of the Tenth Amendment, post n. 10.
7Congress has the "power to tax and to appropriate, limited only by the
requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the general welfare of
the United States." Supra n. 1, at 319.
s "The Constitution requires that public funds shall be spent for a defined
purpose, the promotion of the general welfare . . . . Expenditures would
fail of their purpose and thus lose their constitutional sanction if the terms
of payment were not such that by their influence on the action of the Tecipi-
ents the permitted end would be attained." (Italics supplied.) Supra n. 1,
at 327.
9 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 43 S. Ct. 597 (1933).
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tary concept of unlimited power within those specific fields com-
mitted to the exclusive control of the Federal government. The
basic tenets of the dissent are, it is submitted, unsound because
of this failure to survey the Constitution as a whole and the in-
sistence in arguing that because there are no express limitations
upon the scope of the general welfare clause it necessarily follows
that none are implied. No lawyer would attempt to construe a
contract, deed or will upon such principles."
The opinion, therefore, is based upon the proposition that
the general welfare clause is subject to the inherent limitation
that it does not confer power to intermeddle in local matters the
control of which is reserved to the states or to the people. It is
submitted that this is quite unshakable ground. Despite the
derisive observation in the dissent that resort to extreme examples
"must leave unmoved any but the mind accustomed to believe that
it is the business of courts to sit in judgment on the wisdom of
legislative action", it is further submitted that the opinion is
justified in citing possible examples. It is a sound rule of stat-
utory construction to test a principle by its possible applications.
Again, the failure of the dissent to recognize the principle
of inherent limitations accounts for its reliance upon an analogy
to the power to regulate commerce. The argument runs in this
wise: The power to regulate interstate commerce is not limited by
the fact that its exercise has had a coercive and regulatory effect
upon intrastate industries. Therefore, exercise of the power under
the general welfare clause likewise is not limited by its coercive
and regulatory effect. The conclusion does not follow. The com-
merce clause confers unlimited power within a limited field. It
may interfere with local activities of the states or of the people
because they have by delegation consented thereto. This is no
argument to show that by delegation of power under the general
welfare clause the states or the people have made a similar con-
cession, because the nature of the two powers is essentially differ-
ent. The commerce clause is a delegation of unlimited power
within a comparatively circumscribed field of activity. The gen-
eral welfare clause cannot be so interpreted because there is no way
of circumscribing its field which, by very definition, is general.
After condemning the Act as a compulsory regulation, the
10 Cf. The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution: "IThe powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
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opinion states an elaborate dictum to the effect that even if the
plan were one for purely voluntary cooperation it would be un-
constitutional for the reason that "contracts for the reduction of
acreage and the control of production are outside the range" of
the power of Congress. By this language it is apparently meant
that Congress has no contractual capacity. There is no contract
for want of parties; or perhaps the analogy of ultra vires more
nearly approximates the concept. At any rate, the dissent would
seem to have the better of the argument.
If it for one moment be conceded that Congress has the power
to make a gift of money for non-federal purposes and objects, there
is no stopping place. The opinion so concedes at least to the ex-
tent that no one has the right to question the propriety thereof.
If it may make the gift, it would seem to follow that it may take
the further step and insert a condition either that the recipient use
the money for a specified purpose or perform some other act.
This would seem to be true although the contemplated use or act
were non-federal in object and purpose, or even positively sub-
versive - not because the action of Congress would be within its
powers, but because no one can contest it. Why may it not then,
with similar objects and purposes, substitute for the condition a
promise? Stated another way, this means that while the power to
make a gift without strings is unlimited, the attachment of strings
(in the form of a return promise) limits the power.
That is why the doctrine of Massachusetts v. Mellon" is of
such vast import. While that decision stands there is apparently
nothing to prevent Congress from spending the general revenues
of the government in order to accompiish any and all ends deemed
economically desirable or politically expedient, regardless of any
realistic relationship with the granted powers. The writer has
previously pointed this out in connection with veterans' legisla-
tion.12 If, however, such expenditures have for their object regula-
tion of local -matters by economic coercion, it is not without the
bounds of possibility that a non-complying citizen could enjoin the
payments because he would be able to show an individual injury to
his rights of property or of person, which was lacldng in Massa-
chusetts v. Mellon.
Assume in any type of case a competent complainant. We
are still confronted by the majority's concession of the power of
21 upra n. 9.
2 Donley, Veterans' Legislation and Limitations Uyon the Inplied Powers
of Congress (1933) 39 W. VA. L. Q. 197.
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Congress to spend general revenues in order to promote the gen-
eral welfare of the United States. Three possible limitations
could be applied: (1) That while Congress has exclisive authority to
determine whether or not a given expenditure is in fact reasonably
calculated to promote the general welfare, it cannot be made if there
is in addition either the purpose or the effect of regulating local
matters. (2) The theory of Hamilton and Story, which the major-
ity approves: that the power is limited to objects and purposes gen-
eral and not local. Aside from historical reasons which would seem
to be weighty,1" it is submitted that this theory is impossible of
application by the courts without invading the legislative field.
Whether or not crop control is a means reasonably calculated to
promote the general welfare of the United States is a question upon
which minds may differ, and is purely for legislative determina-
tion. (3) Madison's view, that the spending power is limited "to
the enumerated legislative fields committed to Congress." This
was, in form, rejected by the majority upon the ground that so
construed the general welfare clause is "mere tautology". For
example, the enumerated power to build post offices and post roads
necessarily implies the power to tax and spend for that purpose.
The point which stands out with almost startling clarity is that
while the court has in form approved the views of Hamilton and
Story, in substance it is the view of Madison which has prevailed.
The first interpretation, above stated, which the Court practically
puts into effect, while formally approving the second interpreta-
tion, above stated, is really only a negative way of phrasing the
third interpretation. To say that Congress cannot spend if it
thereby exercises powers which are not delegated to it indepen-
dently of the general welfare clause, is to say that Congress can
only spend if it thereby exercises powers which are delegated to it
independently of the general welfare clause. This is precisely the
principle for which Madison contended. The Tenth Amendment
recognizes no twilight zone wherein Congress may spend without
encroaching upon fields reserved to the states or to the people.
-ROBERT T. DoLEY.
13 Russell L. Post, The Constitutonality of Government Spening For the
General Welfare (1935) 22 VA. L. REv. 1.
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